【文/观察者网专栏作者 周波】
国际关系专家们热衷讨论"我们是否已经进入了另一场冷战？"并不令人惊讶。这就好比猜测一个即将出生的婴儿是男是女，总有50%的成功概率，真不赖！问题是，唯有当全面战争的可能性消失殆尽，我们才能断定这是一场冷战。
预测未来殊为不易。但可以推测，有三件事将决定21世纪上半叶的面貌：乌克兰战争、中美在印度-太平洋地区的竞争，以及在世界秩序变革中西方（the West）的衰落和与之形成对比的"其他国家 (the "Rest")"的崛起。
尽管没有人知道这场欧洲腹地的战争会持续多久，但没有一场战争会永远进行下去。最坏的结果是普京总统决定使用战术核武器扭转局面，这是谁都不愿看到的；最好的结果则是停战，这是谁都不喜欢的。乌克兰只有依赖西方不间断的支持才能继续战斗，如果战争演变为一场消耗战，则乌克兰能否持续作战犹未可知。纵然俄罗斯战果并不明显，但鉴于其军力、军工和经济方面的优势没有因战争而受到实质性削弱，俄罗斯仍能支撑这场战争。
一座新的"柏林墙"最终将出现在乌克兰，这似乎是可能的前景。这将改变欧洲的安全架构，欧洲将不得不与一个被大大削弱但更加危险的俄罗斯共处。之所以说俄罗斯更加危险，恰恰是因为它虽然被大大削弱了，但仍然拥有着世界上最大的核武库。
说得讽刺一点，如果北京和华盛顿之间达成的唯一共识，仅仅是避免冲突，那么我们大概已经处于一场新的冷战之中。不过，这场新冷战的不同之处在于，这是两个巨头之间的竞争，而不是两个集团之间的竞争。华盛顿无力领导一个反华联盟，北京也无意领导全球南方反对美国。所有国家都会以务实的态度谨慎面对中国和美国，在具体问题上就事论事，而不是盲目地选边站队。
关于台湾成为下一个乌克兰的说法已然甚嚣尘上。但只要北京认为和平统一仍有可能，台海一战就不是不可避免的。迄今为止，北京还没有失去耐心。这反映在几十年来一贯低于中国国民生产总值2%的国防预算上；也反映在中国人民解放军4月在台湾周边的第二次军事演习中。与美国众议院议长佩洛西2022年窜访台湾后的第一次军事演习不同，北京在4月的反应更加谨慎克制，只进行了模拟攻击。
无论乌克兰战争的结果如何，两个趋势很可能会继续下去：西方影响力式微，"其他国家"进一步崛起。根据美国华盛顿的非政府组织"自由之家"的民意调查，西方民主在过去17年来一直在稳步下滑。与之相反，多个国家正在排队加入上海合作组织和金砖国家。关于用本地货币而不是美元进行交易的讨论日益热烈。
世界应该害怕中国吗？这是德国《时代》周报在最近一次采访中问我的第一个问题。如果来自全球南方国家的人被问及同样的问题，我想答案会和我一样--"不应该"。中国和西方参与全球南方的主要区别是，中国的所作所为不附加道德说教。如果真的存在争取第三方的竞争，以美国为首的西方国家已经远输给了中国，特别是在非洲和拉丁美洲地区。
在今年的慕尼黑安全会议上，中国和俄罗斯被放在一边，西方被放在另一边， 以表明民主与独裁的分野。这样简单的非黑即白的画面并不是世界应有的样子。即使北京和莫斯科都在谈论多极化的世界，但他们的世界观也有微妙的不同。北京是现有国际秩序下全球化的最大受益者；莫斯科则对这种秩序感到不满并认定自己是受害者。在与美国不断交恶的情况下，北京至少与西方保持着貌合神离的关系；而对莫斯科来说，这已经是不可能的事情。
但是，当中国和西方谈论国际秩序的时候，他们谈论的是同一件事吗？西方的主流观点是，二战后的国际秩序是西方主导的"自由主义国际秩序"，这是自我陶醉。尽管许多规则、制度乃至机构，如国际货币基金组织、世界银行和关贸总协定/世界贸易组织都是西方在二战后设计和建立的，但它们都主要关乎经济领域，不能涵盖整个体系。国际秩序应该包括不同的宗教、文化、习俗、国家身份和社会制度等特征。并且，它必须解决诸如全球化、气候变化、疫情和核扩散等全球性问题。
中国能否在2030年超过美国，成为世界最大经济体，还有待观察。这在经济层面不会有太大影响，即便有差异，区别也不会太大。但它会产生心理上的影响。世界会意识到，一个新的黎明已然来临。这并非所谓"美国治世"后的"中国治世"，相反，它将是常识的回归：时代有更替，国家有兴衰。所以，世上唯一的"山巅之城"（美国自诩），只是空空荡荡的（雅典卫城）帕特农神庙。
翻译：蒋绍澄
核译：韩桦
英文原文：
The enthusiasm of international relations pundits for talking about whether we have entered into another cold war is not surprising. It is like guessing the sex of a baby to be born. One has a 50% chance of being right. Not bad at all! The problem is that we shall only be able conclude it's a cold war when the prospect of an all-out war has eventually disappeared.
Predicting the future is a difficult business. But, presumably, three things will shape how the first half of the 21st century looks: the war in Ukraine, China-US competition in the Indo-Pacific and the rise of the "Rest" in contrast to the decline of the West in a changing world order.
Although no one knows how long the war in the heartland of Europe will last, no war lasts forever. The worst outcome would be for President Putin to decide to use a tactical nuclear weapon as a game-changer, while the best outcome would be an armistice, which no one likes. Ukraine can only fight on with the seamless and endless support of the West; this is not a sure thing if the war turns out to be one of attrition. Russia has failed to make obvious gains, but it can sustain the war given its advantages in manpower, military industry and an economy that is not substantively crippled by the war.
It seems probable that a new "Berlin Wall" will eventually appear in Ukraine. This will change Europe's security architecture. Europe will have to live with a Russia that is much weakened but far more dangerous. It will be more dangerous precisely because it is much weakened, but still has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world.
The war in Ukraine will most certainly accelerate geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts from the West to the East. The Biden administration had hoped to put Russia policy on a "stable and predictable" footing in order to focus on China, which it perceives as a long-term threat. But the war has undoubtedly distracted America's attention and syphoned off resources.
Cynically speaking, if there is consensus - the only consensus - between Beijing and Washington to avoid a conflict, then probably we are already in a new cold war. What makes this new cold war different, though, is that this is a rivalry between two giants, rather than two blocs. Washington could not lead an anti-China alliance and Beijing could not lead the Global South against America. All countries will deal with China and the US carefully, with pragmatism, making choices on specific issues, rather than blindly picking sides.
Much has been said about Taiwan becoming the next Ukraine. But a war in the Taiwan Strait is not inevitable so long as Beijing believes peaceful reunification is still possible. So far, Beijing has not lost patience. This is reflected in its defense budget which is still lower than 2 percent of its GDP, as it has been for decades. It is also reflected in the PLA's second military exercise around Taiwan, in April. Unlike the first one, which involved live firing of weapons, after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taiwan, Beijing's April response was more calculated and measured, with only simulated attacks.
Whatever the outcome of the Ukraine war, two trends are likely to continue: the shrinking influence of the West and the further rise of the Rest. According to a Freedom House poll the western democracies have been in steady decline for 17 years. In contrast, countries are queuing to join the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement and the BRICS. Talk of trading with local currencies instead of American dollars is getting louder.
Should the world be afraid of China? This is the first question I was asked by Die Zeit in a recent interview. If the same question is asked of someone from a Global South country, I guess the answer, like mine, will be "no" . The major difference between Chinese and western involvements in the Global South is that China acts and delivers without moralizing. If there is a competition to win over third parties, the US-led West is very much losing to China, especially in Africa and Latin America.
At the Munich Security Conference this year, China and Russia were put on one side and the West on the other side, to mark a democracy-autocracy cleavage. Such a simplistic black and white picture is not how the world looks. Even if both Beijing and Moscow talk about a multipolar world, their world views are subtly different. Beijing is the largest beneficiary of the globalization that depends on the existing international order; Moscow resents that order and considers itself a victim of it. As its relations with Washington grow steadily worse, Beijing has at least maintained a plausible relationship with the West; this appears to be impossible for Moscow now.
But when China and the West talk about the international order, are they talking about the same thing? The prevailing idea in the West is that the international order after World War II is a West- led "liberal international order" . This is narcissism. Although many rules, regimes and even institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and GATT/WTO were designed and built by the West after World War II, they are primarily found in the economic field and cannot define a whole system. The international order should include, among other features, different religions, cultures, customs, national identities and social systems. And it must address globalization, climate change, pandemics and nuclear proliferation, to name but a few.
It remains to be seen whether China can surpass the United States to become the largest economy in the world by 2030. This won't matter much economically in that any difference will be marginal. But it will have a psychological impact. The world will perceive a new dawn to have arrived. This will not be a Pax Sinica. Rather, it will be a return to common sense: nations rise and fall. The only "city upon a hill" is the empty temple of the Parthenon.
